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McAllister: Judgment Granting Equitable Relief Cannot Support Award of Puniti

PUNITIVE DAMAGES - Judgment Granting Equitable Relief
Cannot Support Award Of Punitive Damages Where
Actual Damages Are Not Also Recovered
Nabours v. Longview Savings & Loan Association
28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571 (July 17, 1985)
In April of 1981, the Nabours purchased Burke's home which was subject
to a lien and deed of trust 1 held by Metropolitan Savings and Loan Association.2 Since both the lien and deed of trust contained a due-on-sale clause,3
the Nabours sought Metropolitan's consent to finance the house by means of
a wraparound mortgage.4 Metropolitan gave consent conditioned upon the
assumption of Burke's loan by the Nabours. 5 Since Metropolitan had previously informed Mr. Nabours that a violation of the due-on-sale clause would
not result in foreclosure, the Nabours refused to assume the loan.6 After the
1. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 571 (July 17,
1985).
2. See Longview Say. & Loan v. Nabours, 673 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1984), aft'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571 (July 17, 1985). Metropolitan Savings and Loan Association was succeeded by Longview Savings and Loan Association. See id. at 359.
3. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 571 (July 17,
1985). The lien and deed of trust contained a consent clause which stated: "The Grantors
further agree that they will not make any voluntary inter-vivos transfers of the premises or any
part thereof without first obtaining the written consent of the mortgagee. Any such transfer, if
the mortgagee shall not so consent, shall constitute a default under the terms of this instrument .... " See id. at 571.
4. See id. at 571-72. Nabours avoided assuming Burke's mortgage at a higher interest
rate by reaching an agreement with Burke to finance the sale by means of a "wraparound"
mortgage. See Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nabours, 673 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1984), affid, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571 (July 17, 1985). A wraparound mortgage is
defined as:
a second mortgage which wraps around or exists in addition to a first or other mortgage.
A form of secondary financing typically used on older properties having first mortgages
with low interest rates in which a lender assumes the developer's first mortgage obligation
and also loans additional money, taking back from developer a junior mortgage in total
amount at an intermediate interest rate.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (5th ed. 1979).
5. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 572 (July 17,
1985). Metropolitan's letter to Nabours stated that a transfer of property without their consent would be considered a default under the deed of trust. See Longview Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Nabours, 673 S.W.2d 357, 360 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1984), affid, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571
(July 17, 1985). Metropolitan's letter further stated that foreclosure procedures would be pursued in response to any default. See id. at 360
6. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 572 (July 17,
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sale became final, Mr. Burke continued to make mortgage payments to Metropolitan. 7 In August of 1981, Metropolitan commenced foreclosure proceedings against the Nabours alleging that the Nabours had assumed
Burke's loan and defaulted on the payments.' The Nabours obtained a temporary injunction, filed suit to prohibit any foreclosure action, and sought to
recover damages.9 After a jury trial, the Nabours were granted a permanent
injunction prohibiting foreclosure and were awarded punitive damages and
attorneys' fees.1 ° The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the permanent
injunction, but reversed the award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees."1
The Nabours' application for writ of error to the Supreme Court of Texas
was granted 2 to address the issue of whether punitive damages could be
awarded based on an equitable remedy without there being any actual dam-

1985). Nabours previously had purchased a home in which Metropolitan held the lien and
deed of trust. See id. at 572. At that time, a vice-president of Metropolitan informed Nabours
that any response by Metropolitan for violating the consent clauses was a mere formality. See
id. at 572.
7. See id. at 572. The vice-president of Metropolitan contacted Nabours the day before
the sale was to close. See Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nabours, 673 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1984), afid, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571 (July 17, 1985). The vice-president
advised Nabours not to proceed with the sale, but did not mention the enforcement of the
consent clause. See id. at 360. After the sale, Metropolitan did not object to Burke making the
mortgage payments. See id. at 360.
8. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 572 (July 17,
1985). The majority in Nabours stated that since Burke had breached the due-on-sale clause,
default on the note had occurred. See id. at 572.
9. See id. at 571-72. The Nabours also sought damages and attorney's fees under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See id. at 574.
10. See id. at 572. The jury found that Metropolitan had waived the due-on-sale clause
by continuing to accept mortgage payments from Burke. See id. at 571. The jury's punitive
damage award was $126,200. See id. at 572. The jury also concluded that Metropolitan had
caused confusion as to whether written consent was required to waive the due-on-sale clause.
See Longview Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Nabours, 673 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1984), a'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571 (July 17, 1985).
11. See Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nabours, 673 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1984), affld, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571 (July 17, 1985). The court held that the
Nabours were not "consumers" under the Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Act and, therefore, the Nabours were not entitled to relief under the Act. See id. at 361-62. Under the
Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Act, a consumer is defined as:
[A]n individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this
state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the
term does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million or more, or that
is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million or more.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
12. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 210, 213 (Feb. 2,
1985).
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ages recovered. 3 Held - Affirmed. Judgment granting equitable relief cannot support14 an award of punitive damages where actual damages are not also
recovered.
Punitive damages developed from excessive awards of compensatory damages. 5 In the eighteenth century, English juries would, in effect, grant punitive sums since the compensatory damages awarded were far in excess of the
injury to the plaintiff.1 6 Early English courts were reluctant to set aside excessive awards, choosing instead to defer to the judgment of the jury. 7 As

13. See Nabours v. Longview Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 572 (July 17,
1985).
14. See id. at 573-74 (Nabours sought and were denied actual damages in form of "loss of
market value" on their home).
15. See Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages. A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins 37 VAND.
L. REv. 1117, 1119 (1984) (remedy of multiple awards preceded punitive damages). See generally K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (1980) (multiple damages recognized several thousand years before punitive damages). Examples of punitive damages have been noted
in the Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C., the Hittite Law in 1400 B.C., the Hindu Code of
Manu in 200 B.C., and the Bible. See id. at 24.
16. See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C. P. 1763) (suit for wrongful detention, trespass, and assault based on invalid general warrant). The defendant alleged that the
damages were "most outrageous" to which the court responded:
[Tihe personal injury done to him was very small, so that if the jury had been confined by
their oath to consider the mere personal injury only, perhaps 20 pounds damages would
have been thought damages sufficient... they saw a magistrate over all the King's subjects exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Carta, and attempting to destroy the
liberty of the Kingdom by insisting upon the legality of this general warrant ... These are
the ideas which struck the jury on the trial; and I think they have done right in giving
exemplary damages.
Id. at 768-69; see also Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisalof
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, 1160 (1966) (after jury award of excessive damages, court affirmed grant by setting forth concept of punitive damages as statement of societal
disapproval). The Huckle v. Money decision was the first to articulate punitive damages. See
id. at 1160.
17. See, e.g., Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (C. P. 1780) (court declined to interfere
with jury award unless evidence indicated award was so excessive it pointed to misconduct by
jury); Tulledge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 909 (C. P. 1769) (court sustained plaintiff's damage
award in excess of actual injury); Grey v. Grant, 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (C. P. 1764) (court
denied defendant's plea to set aside excessive damages awarded to plaintiff). See generally J.
GHURDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02, at 3 (1985)
(presents historical analysis of punitive damages in English common law). In order to understand the granting of excessive awards by English juries and the courts' reluctance to overrule
excessive awards, it is important to first understand the composition of English juries. See id
at 3. English juries in the eighteenth century were comprised of local citizens who acted as
both witnesses and jurors due to their familiarity with the disputed issue. See K. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(2), at 26 (1980). Based on the jurors' familiarity with the dispute, the court not only deferred to the jury, but was reluctant to review excessive awards. See
Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Court" A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages 41
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, 1159-60 (1966).
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the English courts began to recognize that sums awarded in excess of the
plaintiff's actual injury were punitive in nature, the judiciary focused on both
the defendant's conduct"8 and the resulting injury to the plaintiff.1 9 Judgments awarding excessive damages were sustained to punish the defendant's
misconduct2 ° and to compensate the plaintiff for intangible yet egregious
injuries."
Early American courts generally adopted the English concepts of awarding punitive damages for compensation and punishment,2 2 but the American
courts considered punitive and compensatory damages as two separate and
distinct types of awards.2 3 These early courts held that punitive damages
could only be awarded incident to an independent cause of action.2 4 The
18. See, e.g., Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (C. P. 1814) (court sustained
excessive award stating worse conduct could not be conceived); Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep.
777, 778 (C. P. 1780) (judge approved jury's excessive award upon finding that defendant acted
maliciously); Grey v. Grant, 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (C. P. 1764) (excessive damages upheld by
the court based on defendant's use of excessive physical force).
19. See Bruce v. Rawlins, 95 Eng. Rep. 934, 934-35 (C. P. 1770) (since plaintiff's home
and family were disturbed, court refused to reduce damages); Tulledge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep.
909, 909 (C. P. 1769) (where plaintiff insulted in own home, court refused to overrule damages). For a historical discussion of the origin of punitive damages in England and America,
see Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957).
20. See Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (C. P. 1814) (damages in excess of
injury sustained in order to restrain and punish defendant); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489,
498-99 (C. P. 1763) (purpose of damages to compensate plaintiff and punish and deter guilty
party); see also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 78, at 278 (1935)

(unclear in England whether theory of punitive damages is punitive or compensatory in
nature).
21. See Bruce v. Rawlins, 95 Eng. Rep. 934, 934 (C. P. 1770) (where plaintiff's reputation
injured by defendant's actions, court sustained large damages); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep.
768, 769 (court recognized harm to plaintiff was small, but upheld excessive award due to
indignity suffered by plaintiff); see also Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Tortt 70
HARV. L. REV. 517, 519 (1957) (English courts permitted excessive damages in aggravated
cases for injuries to plaintiff's dignity, feelings, and mental suffering). See generally K. REDDEN, PuNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(C), at 18 (1980) (punitive damages developed to compensate

for intangible injuries to victim not recoverable at common law).

22. Compare Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 464 (1876) (when malice involved, plaintiff
entitled to compensation deserved and defendant should pay) and Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342,
355 (1873) (punitive damages compensatory in nature) with Hawk v. Ridgeway, 33 Iln. 473,
476 (1864) (court authorized award to plaintiff of damages beyond actual injury as punishment
for defendant's willful and wanton misconduct) and McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, 437 (1845)
(excessive damages upheld to punish defendant).
23. See Gill v. Selling, 267 P. 812, 814 (Or. 1928) (plaintiff must be satisfied with complete compensation; punitive damages awarded only in appropriate cases); Kerschbaum v.
Lowrey, 206 N.W. 171, 173 (Minn. 1925) (punitive damages awarded at discretion of jury, not
as a matter of right); see also W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th

ed. 1984) (punitive damages awarded to plaintiff over and above actual damages).
24. See, eg., Schippel v. Norton, 16 P. 804, 807 (Kan. 1888) (cause of action cannot be
based on punitive damages); Ganssly v. Perkins, 30 Mich. 492, 494-95 (1874) (when plaintiff
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requirement that there be an independent cause of action fostered the general rule in American courts that actual damages are a prerequisite to the
granting of punitive damages.25 The courts' different applications of the rule
requiring actual damages before allowing punitive awards has been attributable to courts' varying interpretations of the rule's requirements.2 6
Today, punitive damages are awarded for the purposes of punishment and
deterrence.27 Both the punishment and deterrence purposes focus on the
defendant's improper actions. 28 Punitive damages are awarded if a defendant acts wilfully or wantonly, or in a malicious, reckless, or oppressive manner. 29 Once the requisite behavior is established,3 ° punitive damages are

has right to complain and proves injury, punitive damages recoverable); Hoagland v. Forest
Park Highlands Amusement Co., 70 S.W. 878, 880 (Mo. 1902) (punitive damages incident to
actual damages and cannot form basis of cause of action).
25. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Superior Ct. of Maricopa County, 535 P.2d 1302, 1303 (Ariz.
1975) (before punitive damages recovered, actual damages must be established); Armilio v.
Ward Transp., 302 P.2d 517, 519 (Colo. 1956) (proof of actual damages needed before punitive
damages awarded); Smith v. Krutar, 457 P.2d 459, 464 (Mont. 1969) (plaintiff must show
entitlement to actual damages before punitive damages recoverable).
26. Compare Martin v. United Sec. Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765, 772 (Fla. 1975) (actual
damages must be shown before punitive damages recoverable) and Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc., 529 P.2d 656, 659 (Clo. Ct. App. 1974) (actual damages must be awarded before
punitive damages granted) with Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 288 (D. C. 1975) (punitive
damages awarded where actual damages not recovered) and Haugabrook v. Taylor, 168 S.E.2d
162, 163 (Ga. 1969) (nominal damages will support an award of punitive damages); see also
Saunders Hardware Five and Ten, Inc. v. Low, 307 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(injury presumed in defamation suit and will sustain an award of punitive damages even if no
actual damages). See generally Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L.
REv. 517, 528 (1957) (relationship between punitive and actual damages controversial
subject).
27. See, e.g., Acheson v. Shatter, 490 P.2d 832, 834 (Ariz. 1971) (punitive damages
awarded to punish and deter wrongdoer); Motor Equip. Co. v. McLaughlin, 133 P.2d 149, 159
(Kan. 1943) (purpose of punitive damages to punish and restrain defendant from further
wrongful acts and deter others); Main v. Levine, 118 P.2d 252, 255 (Okla. 1941) (punitive
damages designed to punish, warn, and deter transgressor); see also Sales & Cole, Punitive
Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origin, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1984) (majority of commentators acknowledge basis of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence).
But see Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 A. 692, 693 (Conn. 1930) (purpose of punitive damages is
compensation to plaintiff for injuries); Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (Mich. 1922) (punitive damages not considered punishment, but used to enlarge compensatory damages).
28. See, e.g., Strum, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979) (punitive
damages recoverable when defendant's conduct outrageous); Satterfield v. Rebsamen Ford,
Inc., 485 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Ark. 1972) (malicious conduct by defendant will support award of
punitive damages); Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1970) (when tortfeasor commits
wrongdoing willfully or wantonly, punitive damages recoverable); see also J. GHIARDI & 1.
KIRCHER, PuNTvE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.01, at 2 (1985) (focus of punitive
damages on defendant's conduct).
29. See, eg., Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth., 375 P.2d 696, 702 (Alaska 1962) (malice,
recklssness, or bad motive justify punitive damages); Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer,
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assessed to punish the defendant's wrongdoing, and to deter the defendant
from further misconduct.3" Punishing the defendant for his misconduct also
serves as a general deterrent, by way of example, to others who might engage
in similar misconduct.3 2
Traditionally, punitive damages were not recoverable in a suit seeking equitable relief due to the separation of law and equity.33 Today, since courts
171 So. 214, 221 (Fla. 1936) (where wrongdoer acted willfully, wantonly, with malice, violence, oppression, or fraud, punitive damages may be awarded); Gilman Paper Co. v. James,
219 S.E.2d 447, 450 (Ga. 1975) (willful and wanton misconduct authorize punitive damages).
30. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (4th Ed. 1971).
Professor Prosser asserts:
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or "malice" or
a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.
Id. at 9-10; see also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79, at 280
(1935). Professor McCormick states:
Since these damages are assessed for punishment and not for reparation, a positive element of conscious wrongdoing is always required. It must be shown either that the defendant was actuated by ill-will, malice, or evil motive (which may appear by direct
evidence of such motive, or from the inherent character of the tort itself, or from the
oppressive character of his conduct, sometimes called "circumstances of aggravation"), or
by fraudulent purposes, or that he was so wanton and reckless as to evince a conscious
disregard of the rights of others.
Id. at 280.
31. See Main v. Levine, 118 P.2d 252, 255 (Okla. 1941) (punitive damages to punish and
deter defendant and others); Hicks v. Herring, 144 S.E.2d 151, 155 (S.C. 1965) (punitive damages awarded to punish defendant and deter from like offenses). See generally Comment, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of PunitiveDamages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L.
REv. 133, 134-47 (1982) (discussion of deterrent and punishment purposes of punitive
damages).
32. See, e.g., F. B. C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 198 S.E.2d 595, 599 (Va. 1973) (punishment
of defendant to serve as example to others who would engage in such conduct); John Mohr &
Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 198 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Wis. 1972) (punitive damages to punish defendant
and deter others); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1979) (since punitive damages punish defendant, others warned and deterred).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Bunard, 202 F. 728, 732 (9th Cir. 1913) (equity court has no
authority to award punitive damages); Superior Const. Co. v. Elmo, 104 A.2d 581, 586 (Md.
1954) (punitive damages not recoverable in equity); Mortgage Loan Co. v. Townsend, 152 S.E.
878, 887 (S.C. 1930) (equity court lacks jurisdiction and cannot grant punitive damages). But
see Note, Punitive Damagesin Equity, 16 MD. L. REv. 68 (1956) (author points out that much
authority disallowing punitive damages in equity fails to explain any rationale for their position). Complete justice could be rendered by allowing punitive damages with equitable relief.
See id. at 72. See generally DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 211
(1973) (traditional rule denies punitive damages with equitable relief). Equity courts have
rejected the idea of allowing punitive damages with equitable relief for the following reasons:
(1) plaintiff waived his right to punitive damages by seeking equitable relief, (2) equity courts
lack the power to grant punitive damages; and (3) the principles upon which equitable remedies are based are incompatible with punitive damages. See id. at 211-12.
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of law and equity have merged,3 4 the trend is to allow the recovery of punitive damages in conjunction with equitable relief." However, varying rules
have emerged among the states as to what criteria must be present before
punitive damages can be granted with equitable relief.3 6 A number of states
allowing punitive damages in equitable suits require at least a "showing" or
"finding" of actual damages before punitive damages will be granted.37

34. See I. H. P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d 883, 888 (N.Y. App. Div.
1962) (court granted injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages for interference
with plaintiff's use of premises), affd, 189 N.E.2d 812, 312 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y. 1963). The
court rejected the general rule denying punitive damages in equity suits and reasoned that
since law and equity courts have merged, this rule is based on outdated procedural decisions.
See id. at 888; see also Note, Punitive DamagesHeld Recoverable in Action for EquitableRelief,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 175, 179 (1963) (continued adherence to general rule undermines rationale for merging law and equity).
35. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 211 (1973) (movement

to allow punitive damages with equitable relief). The following decisions have held punitive
damages may be awarded with equitable relief: Martin v. Swenson, 335 F. Supp. 765, 767-68
(M.D. Mo. 1971); Berry v. McLeod, 604 P.2d 610, 613 (Ariz. 1979); Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 66 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937); General Refractories Co. v.
Rogers, 239 S.E.2d 795, 800 (Ga. 1977); Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 825
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1983); Hedworth v. Chapman, 192 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Ind. 1963); Charles v.
Epperson & Co., 137 N.W.2d 605, 618 (Iowa 1965); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431
So. 2d 454, 464 (Miss. 1983); Tahoe Village Realty v. DeSmet, 590 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Nev.
1979); I. H. P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park S. Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d 883, 888, (N.Y. App. Div.
1962), affd, 189 N.E.2d 812, 312 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y. 1963); 12 N.Y.S.2d 32; Eakman v. Robb,
237 N.W.2d 423, 430 (N. D. 1975); Z. D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla.
1975); Kneeland v. Bruce, 336 S.W.2d 319, 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960); National Bank of
Commerce v. May, 583 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.);
White v. Ruditys, 343 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
36. Compare Smith v. Krutar, 457 P.2d 459, 464 (Mont. 1965) (to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must show he is first entitled to actual damages) with Wilner v. O'Donnell,
637 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (actual damages must be recovered before punitive
damages can be granted).
37. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 404 (Iowa
1982) (in suit for interference with lease rights, equitable relief and punitive damages sustained,
while actual damages reversed). The court in Westway held that although the amount of actual damages could not be ascertained, punitive damages were still recoverable since actual
injury was demonstrated. See id. at 404; see also Miller v. Fox, 571 P.2d 804, 808 (Mont.
1977) (award of punitive damages for wrongful attachment). The trial court in Miller found
that the plaintiff had suffered actual damages due to expenses incurred. See id. at 808. The
award of punitive damages in Miller was sustained by the Montana Supreme Court which
stated that actual damages are a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages. See id. at 808;
see also Barber v. Hohl, 123 A.2d 785, 789-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (suit for
injunction and actual and punitive damages). Even though the court in Barber held that the
plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on the issue of actual damages, punitive damages were
sustained. See id. at 789-90. The Barber court found that when an individual is injured as a
result of an invasion of a legal right, damages are inferred. See id. at 789; see also Hutchinson
v. Pyburn, 567 S.W.2d 762, 765-66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (action for rescission of deed and
punitive damages). In Hutchinson, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to punitive
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Courts requiring a "showing" or "finding" of actual damages contend that if
the plaintiff provides evidence of the injury suffered, the plaintiff may recover punitive damages without recovering actual damages.3" Other states
permit an injured plaintiff to recover punitive damages in an equitable action
where only nominal damages are recovered. 39 A small minority of states
have allowed recovery of punitive damages with equitable relief absent a
showing or recovery of either actual or nominal damages." Despite more
lenient views, many states require that actual damages be recovered as a
prerequisite to an award of punitive damages, even when equitable relief is
granted.41
Since 1855,42 Texas has followed the minority viewpoint, permitting the

damages since the plaintiffs proved entitlement to the rescission of the deed, return of the
purchase price, and incurred incidental damages. See id. at 766.
38. See Miller v. Fox, 571 P.2d 804, 808 (Mont. 1977) (unnecessary for monetary value to
be placed on actual damage award); Topanga Corp, v. Gentile, 58 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967) (tortious act needs to be proven to meet requirements of actual damages before
punitive damages recoverable); see also Sterling Drug v. Benatar, 221 P.2d 965, 970 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1950) (punitive damages sustained although amount of actual damages not ascertainable); cf Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (W. Va. 1982) (in suit where no equitable relief
sought, court held when plaintiff establishes injury caused by defendant, an award of actual
damages not necessary to sustain punitive damages).
39. See Onslow Wholesale Plumbing & Elec. v. Fisher, 298 S.E.2d 718, 723 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1982) (in suit for violation of fiduciary duties, punitive damages denied in absence of
recovery of nominal or compensatory damages). The Onslow court held that nominal damages
were the minimum requirement before punitive damges could be granted with an equitable
remedy. See id. at 723; see also Civic W. Corp. v. Zela Indus., Inc. 135 Cal. Rptr. 915, 926
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (in action for injunction and recovery on promissory notes, punitive
damages recoverable though actual damges nominal).
40. See, e.g., Village of Peck v. Denison, 450 P.2d 310, 314-15 (Idaho 1969) (equitable
suit to enjoin interference with water rights sustained award of punitive damages); Capital Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 682 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Kan. 1984) (punitive damages recoverable in foreclosure action where no actual damages awarded); Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d
775, 778 (Utah 1978) (in action for rescission of property, punitive damages determined considering defendant's conduct, not whether actual damages shown). But see Smith v. Krutar,
457 P.2d 459, 464 (Mont. 1969) (in suit to enjoin defendants from use of stream water, punitive damages denied since plaintiff not entitled to actual damages).
41. See, e.g., Wilner v. O'Donnell, 637 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (punitive
damages denied after actual damage award reversed); Johnson v. Pilgram Mut. Ins. Co., 425
A.2d 1119, 1125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (punitive award upheld after finding that plaintiff had
been granted compensatory damages); National Bank of Commerce v. May, 583 S.W.2d 685,
691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (punitive damages denied where no
actual damages recovered).
42. See, e.g., Western Cottage Piano & Organ Co. v. Anderson, 97 Tex. 432, 435, 79 S.W.
516, 517 (1904) (punitive damages recovered in suit for fraudulent misrepresentation); Oliver
v. Chapman, 15 Tex. 400, 410 (1855) (jury not restricted to awarding actual damages in suit
for fraudulent acts, thus punitive damages recoverable); Mossop v. Zapp, 189 S.W. 979, 981
(Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1916, writ refd) (punitive damages in rescission action sus-
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recovery of punitive damages in an action for equitable relief.4 3 In International Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Holloway," the Texas Supreme Court
reaffirmed the early trend of permitting equitable relief and punitive damages to be recovered in the same action.4 5 In Holloway, the plaintiff sought
both punitive damages and equitable relief.' In reference to the plaintiff's
pursuit of an equitable remedy, the Holloway court stated that the plaintiff's
choice of remedy should not prohibit the recovery of punitive damages.47
However, the general rule in Texas that punitive damages may only be
granted where actual damages are recovered was still applicable to equitable
actions seeking punitive relief.4" Texas courts have sustained awards of punitive damages in equitable suits where the plaintiff has recovered property
or consideration-paid-out as a result of the defendant's misconduct.49 Texas
courts regard the plaintiff's recovery of property or consideration as actual
damages sufficient to support a punitive award. 5 °
In Nabours v. Longview Savings & Loan Association,51 the Texas Supreme
Court held that punitive damages are not recoverable in an equitable action
tained). But see Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935,
no writ) (punitive damages denied when equitable relief of rescission sought).
43. See Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1363 (5th Cir. 1984) (contrary to majority rule,
Texas allows punitive damages in equitable actions); Note, Punitive Damages in Equity, 16
MD. L. REv. 68, 70 (1956) (although general rule is that punitive damages not allowed in
equity, Texas adopts view allowing punitive damages to be recovered with equitable relief).
44. 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
45. See id. at 583. The Holloway court recognized that there is a difference of opinion
among the states on whether to allow punitive damages to be awarded with equitable relief.
See id. at 583. The Holloway court stated, however, that the trend in Texas has been to allow
punitive damages in equitable suits. See id. at 583.
46. See id. at 570-71.
47. See id. at 584.
48. See Bibby v. Preston, 555 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ)
(right to seek damages acknowledged in suit to remove cloud from title, but punitive damages
denied since no actual damages recovered); Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 460 S.W.2d
233, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref d n.r.e.) (recovery of actual damages required
before awarding punitive damages in equitable action).
49. See Russell v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (return of $8,000 in agency fees sufficient to support punitive damages in forfeiture
action); Pollard v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 343 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1961,
writ refd n.r.e.) (punitive damages upheld where plaintiff allowed to rescind fraudulently induced conveyances).
50. See Kress v. Soules, 255 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1953) (in suit for
specific performance of contract, punitive damages sustained based on recovery of rental value
of property), rev'd on other grounds, 261 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1953); see also Briggs v. Rodriguez,
236 S.W.2d 510, 515-16 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1951, writ refd n.r.e.) (suit for rescission of deed). In Briggs, the court stated "the recovery of the consideration paid as a result of
fraud constitutes actual damages and will serve as a basis for the recovery of exemplary damages." See id at 516.
51. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571 (July 17, 1985).
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unless there is a finding of actual damages by the trier of fact.52 The majority focused on two Texas rules as a basis for adhering to the requirement that
actual damages be recovered before an award of punitive damages may be
had.53 The first rule adhered to by the court was that actual damages are a
prerequisite since any punitive damages assessed must bear a reasonable relationship to the plaintiff's actual damage award.54 Secondly, the court upheld the rule that punitive damages can only be recovered incident to a tort
action in which actual damages are a necessary element." The majority
distinguished other Texas cases allowing recovery of punitive damages with
equitable relief when actual damages were not awarded by the court.56 The
court explained that the actual damage requirement was met in these earlier
cases because the plaintiff recovered property or consideration from the
defendant."
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kilgarlin strongly contended that the ma-

52. See id. at 574. The Nabours court cited Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers and City
Prods. Corp. v. Berman to support the rule requiring recovery of actual damages before granting punitive damages. See id. at 572; see also Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d
751, 753-54 (Tex. 1984) (punitive damages denied in defamation where actual damages not
awarded); City Prods. Corp. v. Berman, 610 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. 1980) (punitive damages
denied when only equitable relief granted).
53. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 573 (July 17,
1985).
54. See id. at 573. The Nabours court cited Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus,Southwestern Inv.
Co. v. Neely, and InternationalBankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, as authority for requiring
punitive damages to be reasonably proportionate to actual damages. See id. at 573; see also
Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981) (Krauscourt set forth factors to
determine whether punitive damages award was excessive); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Neeley,
452 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Tex. 1970) (court remanded case where appellate court failed to
consider ratio between punitive and actual damages); International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963) (excessiveness of award determined by injury to
plaintiff and defendant's conduct).
55. See Nabours v. Longview Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 573 (July 17,
1985). In Nabours, the court relied on Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, and City Prods. Corp. v.
Berman, as requiring a proof of a tort before punitive damages are recoverable. See id. at 573;
see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981) (recovery of punitive
damages denied since no proof of independent tort); City Prods. Corp. v. Berman, 610 S.W.2d
446, 450 (Tex. 1980) (even when distinct willful tort proven, plaintiff must also prove actual
damages suffered to recover punitive damages).
56. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 573 (July 17,
1985). The court distinguished Fillion v. Troy which was relied upon by the Nabours as authority for permitting injunctive relief to support punitive damages. See id. at 573 (distinguishing Fillion v. Troy, 656 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
The majority points out that Fillion dealt with rescission of conveyances, not injunctive relief.
See id. at 573.
57. See id. at 573. In discussing Fillion, the majority points out that in equitable actions
where the plaintiff is allowed to recover property, the actual damage requirement is met. See
id. at 573. In Fillion, the plaintiff was granted a rescission of a conveyance which the Fillion
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jority disregarded the historical basis of punitive damages by requiring that
actual damages be recovered before punitive damages can be awarded. 8
The dissenting opinion attacked the majority's reliance on the rule requiring
actual damages based on the theory that punitive damages will not be excessively awarded. 9 Justice Kilgarlin noted that other factors are available to
assess the appropriateness of the punitive award." The dissent further asserted that the majority incorrectly focused on the plaintiff's choice of remedy rather than the defendant's misconduct, 61 thus ignoring the purpose for
which punitive damages are imposed.62 Justice Kilgarlin argued that equitable relief should be sufficient support for an award of punitive damages without the recovery of actual damages.6 3 The dissent cited other jurisdictions
allowing the plaintiff to recover punitive damages upon proof that a legally
protected right was invaded
by a defendant possessing the requisite intent as
64
position.
its
for
support
The Texas Supreme Court in Nabours adheres to the majority viewpoint
requiring the recovery of actual damages before punitive damages can be
awarded .6 5 The first weakness with the majority's stance, assuming that a
court held sustained an award of punitive damages. See Fillion v. Troy, 656 S.W.2d 912, 915
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
58. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 573 (July 17,
1985) (Kilgarlin, J., joined by Spears, Ray, and Robertson, J.J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 575 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 575 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). Justice Kilgarlin cited Alamo Nat'i Bank v.
Kraus 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981), for factors to be used in assessing the appropriateness of a
punitive damage award. The dissent also points out that the majority could have used the
value of the Nabours' house as a foundation for determining the amount of punitive damages.
See id. at 575.
61. See id. at 575 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). Justice Kilgarlin stated that the majority's
ruling forces the Nabours to make a "Hobson's choice." See id. at 575. The Nabours would
be forced to allow the defendant to foreclose on their home or abandon their action for punitive damages. See id. at 575.
62. See id. at 575 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). By denying the Nabours punitive damages,
the dissent questioned what will deter the defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. See id. at 575.
63. See id. at 576 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the requirement
of actual damages is part of a broader rule requiring the plaintiff to first plead an independent
cause of action. See id. at 576.
64. See id. at 576 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting); see also Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487,
492-93 (Alaska 1976) (punitive damages granted in absence of recovery of actual damages
when independent cause of action demonstrated); Village of Peck v. Dennison, 450 P.2d 310,
314 (Idaho 1969) (where legally protected interest was invalid, actual damages need not be
recovered before granting punitive damages).
65. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 572 (July 17,
1985); see also Anderson v. Alcus, 42 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, no
writ) (plaintiff denied punitive damages in defamation suit since only nominal damages recovered). The rule adhered to by the Anderson court illustrates a failure to recognize when actual
damages are an element of the cause of action. See Note, 16 MiNN. L. REv. 438, 439 (1931-
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viable cause of action exists, is that the actual damage prerequisite ignores
the purpose behind the imposition of punitive damages.66 Another weakness
with the majority's viewpoint is that the historical basis for the rule requiring recovery of actual damages prior to punitive damages is unclear and out
dated.67 A third weakness with the majority's reasoning is the majority's
reliance upon the rule requiring actual damages for the purpose of avoiding
excessive punitive awards.6 8 Finally, the majority's stance, requiring actual
damages or the equivalent to be recovered, is overbroad since such a rule
prevents the granting of punitive damages in all equitable actions.69
The Nabours decision ignores the general Texas practice of imposing punitive damages to punish and deter the defendant for the benefit of society.70
Texas courts have traditionally given effect to the punishment and deterrent

32). A showing of actual damages is held by a majority of jurisdictions to be sufficient to
support an award of punitive damages. See Note, Punitive Damages - No Recovery When
CompensatoryDamages Are Compromised, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 261, 262 (1968).
66. See Bernal v. Seitt, 158 Tex. 521, 527, 313 S.W.2d 520, 523 (1958) (punitive damages
awarded as punishment for wrongdoing). The fundamental purpose of punitive damages is not
to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant and deter similar conduct. See Burlington-Rock Island R.R. Co. v. Newsom, 239 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951,
no writ).
67. See Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 150, 70 S.W.2d 397, 409
(1934). In Russell, the court cites 13 TEXAS JURISPRUDENCE § 132 as authority for the rule
requiring the recovery of actual damages. See id. 150, 70 S.W.2d at 409. Section 132 of TEXAS
JURISPRUDENCE cites one case in which the plaintiff was denied actual damages, but still was
granted punitive damages by the jury. See 13 TEX. JUR. § 132 (1955) (citing Dees v. Thompson, 166 S.W. 56, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1914, no writ)).
68. See Schutz v. Morris, 201 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ).
The court in Schutz stated:
No set rule or ratio as between the amount of actual damages and that of exemplary
damages can be laid down. Of necessity excessiveness vel non of exemplary damages must
depend upon the facts of the particular case; and is a matter left largely to the discretion
of the jury. The amount of exemplary damages warranted depends, among other things,
upon the nature of the wrong, the character of the conduct involved, the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer, the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned, and the
extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
Id. at 147.
69. Compare City Prods. Corp. v. Berman, 610 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. 1980) (injunctive
relief granted, but punitive damages denied since no actual damages recovered) with Fillion v.
Troy, 656 S.W.2d 912, 915 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.) (punitive
damages affirmed based on rescission of conveyances even though no actual damages

recovered).
70. See Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 109, 170 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1943) (punitive
damages awarded in excess of actual damage to punish defendant); Cotton v. Cooper, 209 S.W.
135, 138 (rex. Comm'n App. 1919, opinion adopted) (punitive damages intended to punish
defendant for public good). The policy consideration allowing punitive damages in Texas is
punishment of the wrongdoer's behavior. See Pedernales Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Schultz, 583
S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ reed n.r.e.).
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objectives by focusing on the defendant's misconduct to determine whether
punitive damages were warranted. 7 ' The majority in Nabours, however, denied punitive damages based on the plaintiff's choice of remedy. 72 The focus
adopted by the Nabours court is a shift from its earlier viewpoint in Holloway,73 where the court stated that the plaintiff's choice of remedy should not
prohibit the recovery of punitive damages. 4 In assessing whether the
amount of punitive damages granted was excessive, the Holloway court explained that the proper considerations were the defendant's conduct and the
remedy chosen in relation to the injury suffered by the plaintiff.7" The court
in Holloway recognized the purpose of punitive damages and stated that punitive damages in equitable actions should be determined on a case-by-case
basis.7 6 In Nabours, however, the court strictly adheres to the rule requiring
actual damages as a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.77
Nabours, therefore, fails to impose punitive damages against the defendant
inspite of jury findings that the defendant's conduct warranted a punitive
award. 78 Thus, the majority's ruling in Nabours conflicts with the recog-

71. See Chandler State Bank v. Dorsey, 618 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1981, no writ) (malice inferred from defendant's conduct will sustain punitive damages); Lubbock Bail Bond v. Joshua, 416 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ) (to
sustain punitive damages, defendant's actions must be malicious).
72. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 573-74 (July 17,
1985). The majority in Nabours remarks that if the Nabours had sought actual damages on a
broader scale, instead of limiting the jury to the loss of market value, perhaps the Nabours
would have been granted actual damages. See id. at 573-74.
73. See International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex.
1963). In Holloway, the court stated that the willful and fraudulent acts of the defendant
supported the equitable relief sought. See id. at 584. In holding that the remedy sought should
not preclude punitive damages, the Holloway court further stated that equitable principles
permitted the awarding of punitive damages for the defendant's unconscionable conduct. See
id. at 584.
74. See id. at 584.
75. See id. at 584. In Holloway, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to
breach their fiduciary duty by misappropriating the plaintiff's corporate funds. See id. at 570.
76. See id. at 584.
77. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 572-73 (July 17,
1985). In Nabours, the majority fails to address the nature and purpose of punitive damages,
the defendant's conduct, or the injury to the Nabours. See id. at 572-74.
78. See id. at 574 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting) (findings of jury indicates Longview Savings
knew their actions were wrong). The Nabours secured the following jury findings:
(i) The bank instituted foreclosure proceedings against the Nabours home... with full
knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Nabours' purchase. (Issues
Nos. 5, 5a, 7, 7a, 7b; (Tr. 101, 103) ....
despite having knowingly and intentionally
waived its rights of foreclosure by at least three acts prior to its attempt to foreclose.
(Issue Nos. 2a, 5a, 6a, 7b, 8a; Tr. 98, 101, 102, 103, 104).
(ii) The bank's foreclosure documents contained false statements which were knowingly
made with the intent to cause confusion and harmful consequences to the Nabours. (Issues Nos. 9, 9a, 9b, 10, 10b; Tr. 105-106).
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nized purposes of punitive damages; that is, punishment and deterrence.7 9
The court's absolute adherence to the rule requiring recovery of actual
damages prior to punitive damages is further misplaced since Texas case law
is ambiguous on this requirement."0 The leading case discussing the necessity of recovering actual damages prior to punitive damages is Fort Worth
Elevators Co. v. Russell."1 The Russell court stated that punitive damages
cannot be awarded unless actual damages are recovered. 2 The intent of the
Texas Supreme Court in Russell, however, was unclear. 3 Confusion arose
as to the intent of the Russell court, when the court recognized that the

(iii) The bank falsely represented the nature of the deed of trust under which it sought
foreclosure. (Issues Nos. 12, 12a; Tr. 110.)
(iv) The bank's foreclosure and related acts, were "unconscionable" conduct, done with
knowledge of their falsity, deception, or unfairness. (Issue Nos. 13, 13b; Tr. 112-113).
Moreover... the Nabours also secured four affirmative findings that the bank's conduct
caused them actual damage. In Special Issues Nos. 9b, 10a, 12a, and 13 (Tr. 105, 106,
110), the jury answered "Yes" to the question of whether the bank's conduct" ** was a
producing cause of any damage to the plaintiffs. ***" (Tr. 105, 106, 110).
See Brief for Appellant at 27-8, Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
571 (July 17, 1985).
79. See, e.g., Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1963, writ refd n.r.e.) (good of public and punishment are purposes of punitive damages); South Texas Coaches v. Eastland, 101 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937,
writ dism'd) (punitive damages combine punishment of defendant with interests of society and
plaintiff); Foster v. Bourgeois, 253 S.W. 880, 884-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1923) (theory of
punitive damages to punish defendant and deter others), aff'd, 113 Tex. 489, 259 S.W. 917
(1924).
80. Compare Hughes v. Belman, 200 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947,
writ refd n.r.e.) (punitive damages not recoverable when actual damages not recovered) with
Garza v. San Antonio Light, 531 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ
ref d n.r.e.) (actual damages must be shown before punitive damages granted).
81. 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1934). The Russell case has been cited on numerous occasions as authority for requiring actual damages as a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages. See, e.g., Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1984)
(Russell cited as authority for denying punitive damages in defamation action where no actual
damages recovered); City Prods. Corp. v. Berman, 610 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. 1980) (injunctive
relief granted while actual damages denied; court citing Russell as authority for requirement of
recovery of actual damages prior to award of punitive damages); Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank
of Dallas, 460 S.W.2d 233, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ refd n.r.e.) (in suit for
cancellation and rescission of conveyances, court denied punitive damages citing Russell as
authority that there must first be proof of injury or loss).
82. See Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 149-50, 70 S.W.2d 397, 409
(1934). The court in Russell first stated that punitive damages can only be recovered when the
plaintiff is shown to have suffered injury. See id. at 149, 70 S.W.2d at 409.
83. See id. at 149-50, 70 S.W.2d at 409. The Texas Supreme Court in Russell uses
"shown," "recovery," and "entitled" when addressing actual damages as a prerequisite to punitive damages. See id. at 149-50, 70 S.W.2d at 409. In Russell, the plaintiff was seeking only
punitive damages from the defendant for the death of her husband. See id. at 130, 70 S.W.2d
at 399. The Russell court addressed the issue of a corporation's liability for punitive damages
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plaintiff was precluded from the recovery of actual damages due to the
Workmen's Compensation Act. 4 The Russell court stated that the workmen's compensation problem did not change the rule and that the plaintiff
could recover punitive damages by showing entitlement to actual damage.8 5
The confusion surrounding Russell has increased with a recent interpretation in Doubleday & Company, Inc. v. Rogers. 6 The plaintiff in Doubleday
relied on the entitlement theory stated in Russell in requesting punitive damages for libel per se when no actual damages had been awarded. 7 The court
in Doubleday stated Russell was limited to its unique factual situation; that
is, the entitlement theory would allow a punitive award only in a suit where
actual damages were barred due to the Workmen's Compensation Act. 88
The Doubleday interpretation, however, is questionable since Texas case law,
both before and after Russell, used the terms "finding" or "showing" or
"proof" when addressing the requirement of actual damages as a prerequisite to punitive damages.8 9 Furthermore, the Doubleday court's restricted
reading of the entitlement theory is erroneous in light of numerous cases
applying the entitlement theory to a variety of situations other than worker's
compensation. 90

and the effect of workmen's compensation payments on the recovery of punitive damages. See
id at 130, 70 S.W.2d at 399.
84. See id. at 149-50, 70 S.W.2d at 409.
85. See id. at 150, 70 S.W.2d at 409.
86. 674 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1984).
87. See id. at 754. In Doubleday, the plaintiff was seeking punitive damages in a libel suit.
See id. at 754. The plaintiff contended that since general damages are presumed in a libel suit,
he was entitled to recover punitive damages even though no actual damages were recovered.
See id. at 754.
88. See id. at 754. The majority in Doubleday stated that the rule in Russell was "clearly
intended" to be applicable to the facts of that case only. See id. at 754. The Doubleday court
noted that the plaintiff in Russell was statutorily barred from recovering actual damages due to
the Workmen's Compensation Act. See id. at 754.
89. See, e.g., Giraud v. Moore, 86 Tex. 675, 676, 26 S.W. 945, 946 (1894) (no actual
damages shown, thus no recovery of punitive damages); Traweek v. Martin-Brown Co., 79
Tex. 460, 464, 14 S.W. 564, 565 (1890) (must haveproofof actual damages to recover punitive
damages); Jones v. Matthews, 75 Tex. 1, 1, 12 S.W. 823, 823 (1889) (actual damages must be
found for punitive damages to be allowed); see also City Prods. Corp. v. Berman, 610 S.W.2d
446, 450 (Tex. 1980) (before punitive damages can be granted, plaintiff must prove actual damages); Woodruff v. Bryant, 558 S.W.2d 535, 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ
refd n.r.e.) (finding of actual damages required before punitive damages allowed); Forbau v.
Producers Gas Co., 601 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ) (must have
finding of actual damages to recover punitive damages); Seegers v. Spradley, 522 S.W.2d 951,
957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ re'd n.r.e.) (punitive damages allowed withfinding of actual damages).
90. See, eg., Mabry v. Abbott, 471 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (in action to recover debt prerequisite to award of punitive damages is showing of
loss or injury); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Mitchell, 338 S.W.2d 740, 742 (rex. Civ. App.-
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The majority in Nabours also inferred that the rule requiring actual damages to be awarded prior to a punitive award requires the trier of fact place a
monetary value on the actual damages.9" The Nabours majority cited the
Russell case as the authority requiring that a monetary amount for the actual damages be ascertained, even in cases where actual damages are not
recoverable. 92 However, in doing so, the court adheres to the outdated practice of ascertaining the amount of actual damages before allowing punitive
damages. 93 Since the pecuniary amount of actual damages is often not ascertainable, 94 the position of many jurisdictions is that the plaintiff need only
secure a finding of actual damages or injury suffered as a prerequisite to
punitive damages. 95 By requiring that actual damages be ascertained and
valued before an award of punitive damages can be made, the Texas
Supreme Court sets a standard that is neither logical nor practical in many
situations.9 6

El Paso 1960, no writ) (punitive damages sustained when actual damages found or shown in
trespass case); Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Lineberry, 333 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1960, no writ) (rule in Texas is that actual damages must be recoverable before punitive
damages awarded in trespass case).
91. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 572 (July 17,
1985). The Nabours court stated that in situations where actual damages are not recoverable,
the plaintiff must still obtain a finding from the trier of fact on the amount of the actual
damages before punitive damages are recoverable. See id. at 572.
92. See id. at 572.
93. See Miller v. Fox, 572 P.2d 804, 808 (Mont. 1977). "Although the trier of fact, as a
prerequisite for awarding exemplary damages, must find the claimant suffered actual damages,
it is unnecessary that the trier of fact place a monetary value on the actual damages or make
any award of actual damages." Id at 808; see also Henson v. A. T. Sistare Constr. Co., 113
S.E.2d 341, 345 (S.C. 1960) (presumption of nominal damages that are incapable of being
measured will uphold award of punitive damages).
94. See Howell v. Association Hotels, 40 Hawaii 492, 497 (Hawaii 1954) (showing of
actual damages before awarding punitive damages is possibly holding of majority of cases).
The Hawaii Supreme Court discusses the various ways in which punitive damages can be
sustained. See id at 496-97. The court stated that a majority of cases hold that "proof of
actual damages must be shown even though the actual extent of the money damages may not
be possible of ascertainment." Id. at 497; see also Sterling Drug v. Benatar, 221 P.2d 965, 970
(Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (even though court recognized difficulty in ascertaining monetary value of
actual damages, punitive damages were sustained); Singer Shop-Rite, Inc. v. Rangel, 416 A.2d
965, 968 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (even though the pecuniary value of the injury
cannot be shown, punitive damages are recoverable).
95. See Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonelo, 477 A.2d 1224, 1232 (N.J. 1984)
(punitive damages may be recovered where plaintiff establishes intentional tort, even though
no actual damages recovered); see also Howell v. Association Hotels, 40 Hawaii 492, 497 (Hawaii 1954) (better rule permits punitive damages when plaintiff establishes cause of action even
though no actual damages measured or shown); Westfield Centre Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil,
386 A.2d 448, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (where court determines that legal right
invaded, punitive damages recoverable without recovery of actual damages).
96. Compare Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 572-73

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol17/iss2/9

16

McAllister: Judgment Granting Equitable Relief Cannot Support Award of Puniti

1986]

CASE NOTE

The majority in Nabours argues that ascertaining the amount of actual
damage is necessary so that the punitive damages will bear a reasonable relationship to the actual damages awarded. 97 The purpose of the reasonable
relationship rule is to avoid excessive punitive awards. 98 The reasonable relationship rule has been adopted by a majority of the jurisdictions to provide
guidelines for jurors in assessing punitive damages, 99 but the application of
the rule has been varied."co The current trend is to assess the reasonableness
of the punitive damage award in relation to the defendant's conduct and the
injury inflicted on the plaintiff."0 This variation allows courts to grant punitive damages when the defendant's conduct so warrants, even if no actual
damages are found or ascertained."0 2 In Alamo National Bank v. Kraus,1 3
the Texas Supreme Court set forth several factors to be considered in assess(July 17, 1985) (actual damages in specific amount necessary to support punitive damages
award) with Howell v. Association Hotels, 40 Hawaii 492, 497 (Hawaii 1954) (no actual damages need be determined to support punitive damages) and Westfield Centre Serv., Inc. v.
Cities Serv. Oil, 386 A.2d 448, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (value of legal right may
not be ascertainable, even so breach of right may support punitive damages).
97. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 573 (July 17,
1985) (rule requiring proof of actual damages follows from rule requiring punitive damages to
be reasonably proportionate to actual damages).
98. See K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.6(c), at 63 (1980) (discussion of reasonable
relation rule). "The value of the 'reasonable relation rule' is that it serves as a rough device to
allow a court to pare down an excessive award of punitive damges." Id. § 3.6; see also W.
PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 14-15 (5th ed. 1984) (punitive damages and actual damages must bear reasonable relationship because small compensatory award will not support a large punitive award).
99. See Comment, The Imposition of Punishmentby Civil Courts: A Reappraisalof Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, 1170 (1966) (reasonable relationship rule attempts to
specify standards for imposing punitive damages); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 530 (1957) (purpose of reasonable relationship method is to
limit jury's discretion).
100. Compare Benyon v. Nesseth, 646 P.2d 1043, 1044-47 (Kan. 1982) (award of
$9,326.06 actual damages and $100,000 punitive damages upheld because it did not shock the
conscience of the court) with Senn v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119, 138 (Mo.
1979) ($491,892 actual damages and $737,838 punitive damages calculated by specific formula
of a "multiple of one and one-half times actual damages").
101. See, eg., Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 435 N.E.2d 729, 746 (III. App.
Ct. 1982) (where jury found defendant acted with conscious indifference with regard to safety
of product users, punitive damages award was appropriate); Leimgruber v. Claridge Assoc.,
Ltd., 375 A.2d 652, 655 (N.J. 1977) (in assessing punitive damages, two factors to consider are
nature of defendant's acts and injury inflicted on plaintiff); Black v. Gardner, 320 N.W.2d 153,
161 (S.D. 1982) (when determining amount of punitive damages, one should consider amount
of actual damages as well as wrongdoer's conduct and intent).
102. See, eg., Haskins v. Sheldon, 558 P.2d 487, 492 (Alaska 1976) (where complaint
states a claim for relief, independent of claim for punitive damages, no actual damages need be
recovered); Nales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (invasion of legal right or injury suffered is requisite to awarding punitive damages, not
recovery of actual damages); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (W. Va. 1982) (where evi-
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ing whether a punitive damage award is excessive) °4 The Kraus court
stressed that consideration of the following factors would help evaluate the
appropriateness of the punitive sum awarded: "(1) the nature of the wrong,
(2) the character of the conduct involved, (3) the degree of culpability of the
wrongdoer, (4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned, and
(5) the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and
propriety."1 5 The factors set forth by the Kraus court focus on the defendant's conduct, and do not address the monetary value of the actual damage
award."°6 Although the Nabours court admits that the value of actual damages is only one factor to be considered, the court denied the punitive damages award without assessing the other factors as noted in Kraus.1 o7 In
Nabours, the plaintiffs secured jury findings that the defendant made false
statements with the foreclosure notice, misrepresented the rights and obligations involved in the deed of trust, and acted maliciously. 0 8 The court in
Nabours therefore denied punitive damages when ample criteria were available to assess reasonable punitive damages."
The majority's rule requiring the recovery of actual damages prior to
granting punitive damages denies punitive awards to plaintiffs who recover
equitable relief but do not recover actual damages or the equivalent."° This
requirement is unsound if punitive damages are to be effectively and fairly
applied."' Traditionally, courts have required an independent cause of ac-

dence of injury to plaintiff, failure to recover actual damages does not preclude granting of
punitive damages).
103. 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981).
104. See id. at 910.
105. See id. at 910.
106. See id. at 910.
107. See Nabours v. Longview Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 573 (July 17,
1985) (proportionate rule not rigid, but to be used based on facts of case).
108. See id. at 571.
109. See id. at 575 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). Justice Kilgarlin suggests that the value of
the house could have been used to determine the proper proportion of punitive damages. See
id at 575 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus is also cited by the dissenting
opinion as setting forth criteria to assess the excessiveness of the punitive damages award. See
id. at 575 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting); see also Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 910 (Tex.
1981) (factors used in determining whether punitive damage award excessive include injury
inflicted, defendant's conduct, situation of parties, and public response to conduct).
110. See Nabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 574 (July 17,
1985). The Nabours were successful in obtaining injunctive relief which did not require actual
damages as an element. See id. at 571. Because the Nabours did not receive a jury finding of
actual damages the Nabours were denied punitive damages. See id. at 574.
111. Compare City Prods. Corp. v. Berman, 610 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. 1980) (punitive
damages denied with case granting injunctive relief) with Russell v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948,
955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (punitive damages granted where
plaintiff recovered money lost as result of defendant breaching fiduciary duty).
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tion before punitive damages could be granted.1 12 The requirement of an
independent cause of action satisfies the existing rule that an action for punitive damages alone cannot be maintained.1 13 Unfortunately, since most tort
actions require a showing of actual damages, many courts expanded the rule
to include recovery of actual damages." 4 Many jurisdictions have adopted
the rule that when a plaintiff establishes an independent cause of action and
the requisite misconduct of the defendant, punitive damages should be allowed."
These jurisdictions recognize that the invasion of a legal right
often does not result in pecuniary loss. 116 Therefore, the rule allowing a
punitive award after equitable relief, without an actual damage award, allows punitive damages to be imposed for their intended purposes of punishment and deterrence. 17 The rule applied by the majority in Nabours fosters
112. See Schippel v. Norton, 16 P. 804, 807 (Kan. 1888) (if plaintiff has no "cause of
action independent of claim" for punitive damages, there is no valid claim for punitive damages); see also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 83, at 293 (1935)
(punitive damages do not create causes of action). "[TIhe first inquiry must be, 'Does the
complaint state a cause of action if the allegations relied upon solely to support the claim for
exemplary damages be disregarded?' If it does not, it is insufficient, and the claim for exemplary damages collapses with the rest of the case." Id. at 293.
113. See Pringle Tax Serv., Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1979) (punitive damages recoverable incident to a cause of action); Hilbert v. Roth, 149 A.2d 648, 652
(Pa. 1959) (punitive damages mere incident to a cause of action).
114. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 22, at 88 (1935) (in
evolution of tort actions, more torts required actual loss or damages to be actionable). In
earlier tort actions, proof of wrongdoing by the defendant would support an award of damages.
See id. at 87. The movement in the law of tort requiring actual damages or injury to be present
before a cause of action is viable has fostered the rule that actual damages must be recovered
before punitive damages can be recoverable. See id. at 294.
115. See Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1972) (stockholders derivative action). The court in Holden recognized that punitive damages are recoverable where a legally protected right has been invaded. See id. at 359. The requirement of
actual damages as a prerequisite to granting punitive damages is to ensure that there is an
invasion of a legally protected right before granting punitive relief. See Village of Peck v.
Denison, 450 P.2d 310, 314-15 (Idaho 1969). The court in Peck held that this requirement can
be filled by an award of equitable relief. See id. at 315. In either situation, a legally protected
interest of the plaintiff has been invaded and should be compensated. See i at 315.
116. See, eg., Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansul & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1228 (N.J.
1984) (nominal damages inferred in absence of actual loss where legal right invaded); Westfield
Centre Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 386 A.2d 448, 464 (N.J. 1978) (since injunction
prevented jury from finding actual damages, nominal damages inferred to support award of
punitive damages); Henson v. A. T. Sistar Constr. Co., 113 S.E.2d 341, 345 (S.C. 1960) (where
no substantial damage shown, but a legally protected right involved, punitive damages supported by inferred nominal damages).
117. See Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 682 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Kan. 1984)
(punitive damages granted for willful breach of trust even though no actual damages were
recovered). InHohman, the court held that the requirement of actual damages was satisfied
by the grant of equitable relief. See id.at 1310. In Hohman, the court allowed punitive damages stating that the deterrent effect was proper. See idat 1310. The issue of whether to grant
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inconsistent and unfair results because it does not effectuate the punishment
and deterrence purposes of punitive damages. I's The inequity promoted by
the Nabours court's adherence to ambiguous Texas law is apparent since
Texas courts may allow punitive damages to be granted with equitable relief
if the plaintiff recovers actual damages for a loss caused by the defendant's
misconduct, yet still deny punitive damages in cases granting equitable relief
alone. 119
By failing to assess the facts present in the Nabours situation, the Texas
Supreme Court continues to follow a rule that is outdated and unsound. The
decision by the court in Nabours overlooks the historical basis and policies
underlying punitive damages. The Texas Supreme Court fails to give
credance to the punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive damages by
insisting on adherence to the rule requiring the recovery of actual damages
prior to granting punitive damages. The court in Nabours adheres to this

punitive damages should be based on the defendant's conduct, and not actual damages. See
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775, 778 (Utah 1978) (punitive damages must be based on
defendant's conduct).
118. CompareNabours v. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 571, 574 (July
17, 1985) (where no actual damages awarded by jury, no punitive damages can be awarded)
with Fillion v. Troy, 656 S.W.2d 912, 915 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (court awarded punitive damages in absence of recovery of actual damages where
plaintiff allowed to rescind deeds).
119. See, e.g., Adams v. Harris, 564 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th
Dist.] 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.) (equitable relief allows punitive damage recovery when actual
damages granted); Phillips v. Wertz, 546 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (where only injunctive relief granted, plaintiffs denied punitive damages); Teas v.
Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 460 S.W.2d 233, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ)
(plaintiff granted rescission of conveyances, but denied punitive damages where no actual damages recovered); see also Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196, 201 (2nd Cir. 1896) (court
declined to follow Texas rule requiring recovery of actual damages before granting punitive
damages). In this regard, the Monroe court stated:

[T]here is neither sense nor reason in the proposition that such additional damages may

be recovered by a plaintiff who is able to show that he has lost $10.00, and may not be
recovered by some other plaintiff who has sustained, it may be, far greater injury, but is
unable to prove that he is poorer in pocket by the wrongdoing.
Id. at 201. In addition, if the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer, punitive
damages should be granted when a defendant's conduct so warrants and there is an invasion of

a legally protected right. See Howell v. Association Hotels, 40 Hawaii 492, 498-500 (1954).
The Howell court further stated:
Consequently, it seems desirable to recognize the principle that, if a cause of action is
found to exist by the jury, in a case where "actual" damage is not an essential element of
the cause of action, then, if the necessary culpability on defendant's part be established, a
verdict for exemplary damages is proper, though the award of other damages is nominal
or absent entirely.

Id. at 499 (quoting C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 83, at 294

(1935)). The Howell court also points out that McCormick refused to follow the Texas doctrine. See id at 499.
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rule even though confusion exists in Texas courts over the proper application
and requirements of the rule. The majority misapplies the requirement that
actual and punitive damages be reasonably related by focusing only on the
monetary value of actual damages and disregarding the defendant's egregious conduct. Furthermore, the majority's position results in inconsistent
and unfair results when equitable remedies are at issue. When the plaintiff
establishes both a cause of action, independent of the request for punitive
damages, and sufficient misconduct by the defendant, punitive damages
should be awarded. The effect of the majority's ruling in Nabours is that
punitive damages will continue to be awarded in an inconsistent manner.
The Nabours case offered an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court of
Texas to restore consistency and equity to the application and availability of
punitive damage awards, but the court unfortunately bypassed the
opportunity.
Beth McAllister

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

21

